Reviews on the principle of effective nationality
孙倩
I. Introduction
In a world of ever-increasing transnational interaction, the importance of individual protection during the processes concurrently increases. Nationality is the principal link between individuals and states but also is the bridge connecting individuals with international law. It is just through the linkage of nationality can a person enjoy diplomatic protection by his parent state. But due to double nationality, there are lots of difficulties to effective diplomatic protection of individuals. The principle of effective nationality was formed through the judicial practice of international court of justice. What is the meaning of the principle of effective nationality? Is it a perfect theory in the face of diplomatic protection of dual national? In this article, the author will introduce the concept of this principle and give her opinions on it.
II: The concept of principle of effective nationality
Nationality of an individual is his quality of being a subject of a certain state. Nationality is of critical importance to individuals, especially with regard to individuals abroad or their property. Firstly, it is the main link between individual and a state. It is evidence that one can be protected by his parent state.
Secondly, to some extent, individuals are not the subjects of international law, so they cannot directly enjoy the rights and undertake responsibilities coming from international law. It is through the medium of their nationality that individuals can normally enjoy benefits from international law.
In principle, nationality as a term of local or municipal law is usually determined by the law of particular state. Each state has discretion of determining who is and who is not, to be considered its nationals. However, there is no generally binding rules concerning acquisition and loss of nationality, and as the laws of different states differ in many points relating to this matter, so it is beyond surprising that an individual may process more than one nationality as easily as none at all. But whether each granted nationality owned by these dual nationals has international effects is in doubt. In another word, the determination by each state of the grant of its own nationality is not necessarily to be accepted internationally without question. Especially, when a dual national seeks diplomatic protection in some third state, that state is not answerable to both of states of his nationality but only one of them. In this situation, the third state is entitled to judge which nationality should be recognized.
As stated in Art1 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on certain questions relating to the conflict of nationality laws, while it is for each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals, such law must be recognized by other states only “in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principle of law generally recognized with regard to nationality”. In the “Nottebohm” case, the International Court of Justice regard nationality as: ‘a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as a result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of the state conferring nationality than with that of any other state’ That is what is called the real and effective nationality. Deriving from the court’s opinion, the principle of effective nationality came into being. The essential parts of effective and real nationality are that which accorded with the facts, which based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one of the states whose nationality is involved. Different factors are taken into consideration, and their importance will vary from one case to the next: the habitual residence of the individual concerned is an important factor, but there are other factors such as the centre of his interests, his families, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc. According to this principle, no state is under obligation to recognize a nationality granted not meeting the requirements of it. In the Nottebohm case, International Court of Justice first enunciated this principle and denied Liechtenstein the right to protect Nottebohm.
III． Nottebohm case and reviews on the principle of effective nationality
In the Nottebohm case, involving Liechtenstein and Guatemala, the former sought restitution and compensation on behalf of Nottebohm for the latter’s actions allegedly in violation of international law.
Nottebohm, a German national resident in Guatemala, had large business interest there and in Germany. He also had a brother in Liechtenstein, whom he occasionally visited. While still a German national, Nottebohm applied for naturalization in Liechtenstein on October 9, 1939, shortly after the German invasion of Poland. Relieved of the three-year residence requirements, Nottebohm paid his fees and taxes to Liechtenstein and became a naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein by taking an oath of allegiance on October 20,1939, thereby forfeiting his German nationality under the nationality law of Liechtenstein. He returned to Liechtenstein early in 1949 on a Liechtenstein passport to resume his business activities. At his request, the Guatemalan ministry of External Affairs changed the Nottebohm entry in its Register of Aliens from “German” to “Liechtenstein” national. Shortly afterward a state of war came into existence between the USA and Germany and between Guatemala and Germany. Arrested in Guatemala in 1943, Nottebohm has deported to the USA, where he was interned as an enemy alien until 1946. Upon his release, Nottebohm applied for readmission to Guatemala but was refused; therefore, he took up residence in Liechtenstein. Meanwhile, the Guatemalan government, after classifying him as an enemy alien, expropriated his extensive properties without compensation.
Liechtenstein instituted proceedings against Guatemala in International Court of Justice, asking the court to declare that Guatemala had violated international law “in arresting, detaining, expelling and refusing to readmit Mr. Nottebohm and in seizing and retaining his property”. The court rejected the Liechtenstein claim by a vote of 11 to 3, declaring that Nottebohm’s naturalization could not be accorded international recognition because there was no sufficient “bond of attachment” between Nottebohm and Liechtenstein.
The Nottebohm decision denied the competence of Liechtenstein to protect a naturalized citizen and the loss of Nottebohm could not be remedied. The application of the “genuine link” theory, borrowed from the very different context of dual nationality problems, has the unfortunate effect of depriving an individual of a hearing on the merits and the protection by a state willing to espouse his claim in the transnational arena. The net effect is an immense loss of protection of human rights for individuals. Such a decision runs counter to contemporary community expectations emphasizing the increased protection of human rights for individuals. If the right of protection is abolished, it becomes impossible to consider the merits of certain claims alleging a violation of the rules of international law. If no other state is in a position to exercise diplomatic protection, as in the present case, claims put forward on behalf of an individual, whose nationality is disputed or held to be inoperative on the international level and who enjoys no other nationality, would have to be abandoned. The protection of the individual which is so precarious under the international law would be weakened even further and the author consider that this would be contrary to the basic principle embodied in Article15 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Right. As a matter of human rights, every person should be free to change his nationality. Thus the Universal Declaration of Human Right states that ‘everyone has the right to a nationality’ (Art.15 (1)).The right to a nationality can be interpreted as a positive formulation of the duty to avoid statelessness. The duty to avoid statelessness is laid down in various international instruments, in particular in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. The term statelessness refers to the “de iure stateless persons” rather than “de-facto stateless persons”. If it is a free choice and if this nationality is to be a benefit rather than a burden to the individual, it should follow that he has the right to renounce one nationality on acquiring a new one. Furthermore, refusal to exercise protection is not accordance with the frequent attempts made at the present time to prevent the increase in the number of cases of stateless persons and provide protection against acts violating the fundamental human rights recognized by international law as a minimum standard, without distinction as to nationality, religion or race. It is unfortunately not the case. While the Nottebohm decision denied the competence of Liechtenstein to protect a naturalized citizen, the Flegenheimer case involved the denial of protection to a national by birth, when and where will the principle of effective nationality be used? This is a question that needs to be thought over. From the standpoint of human rights protection, the application of this principle should be strictly limited.
VI. Conclusion
Nationality is within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, which settles, by its own legislation, the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality. It is sometimes asserted that there must be a genuine and effective link between an individual and a state in order to establish a nationality which must be accepted by other states. It is doubtful, however, whether the genuine and effective link requirement, used by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm-Case in order to deny Liechtenstein’s claim to exercise protection, can be considered as a relevant element for international recognition of nationality or as a requirement of a valid naturalization under public international law. It is frequently argued that in the absence of any recognized criteria the attribution of nationality must be considered as arbitrary and that there must be some kind of a personal and territorial link. The rule, however, although maintained in state practice, has been gradually diminished in its importance due to one exception, which concerning the raising of claims in case of human rights protection, especially to dual nationals who suffers injury in the third state and cannot be protected by his origin nationality state.
References
1, Bauer, O. (2001, first published in 1907). The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
2, ICJRep , 1995, P4, atP23
3, SIR ROBERT JENNINGS & SIR ARTHUR WATTS Oppenheim’s International Law, Longman Group UK LIMITED AND Mrs.Tomokohudso, 1992
全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于批准《中华人民共和国和匈牙利共和国关于民事和商事司法协助的条约》的决定
全国人民代表大会常务委员会
全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于批准《中华人民共和国和匈牙利共和国关于民事和商事司法协助的条约》的决定
（１９９６年３月１日通过）
第八届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第十八次会议决定：批准司法部部长肖扬代表中华人民共和国于１９９５年１０月９日在北京签署的《中华人民共和国和匈牙利共和国关于民事和商事司法协助的条约》。
中华人民共和国和匈牙利共和国
关于民事和商事司法协助的条约
中华人民共和国和匈牙利共和国（以下简称“缔约双方”）在相互尊重主权和平等互利的基础上，为加强两国在司法领域的合作，决定缔约关于民事和商事司法协助的条约，为此目的，各自委派全权代表如下：
中华人民共和国司法部长肖扬
匈牙利共和国司法部长沃什道格·帕尔
缔约双方全权代表互换全权证书，认为妥善后，议定下列各条：
第一章 总则
第一条 司法保护
一、缔约一方国民在缔约另一方境内，享有与缔约另一方国民同等的司法保护。
二、缔约一方国民可以在与缔约另一方国民同等的条件下诉诸缔约另一方司法机关。
三、除第三条规定外，本条约关于缔约双方国民的规定亦适用于根据缔约任何一方法律成立的、且主事务所在该方境内的法人。
第二条 诉讼费用保证金的免除
对于在缔约一方境内的缔约另一方国民，不得因其是外国人或无住所或居所而令其提供诉讼费用保证金。
第三条 诉讼费用的减免
一、缔约一方国民在缔约另一方境内，应在与该缔约另一方国民同等的条件下和范围内享受诉讼费用的减免。
二、本条第一款规定的费用减免所需的有关申请人个人情况及其财产状况的证明，由申请人住所或居所所在地的缔约一方的主管机关出具。如果申请人在缔约双方境内均无住所或居所，则由其本国的外交或领事代表机关出具证明。
第四条 联系途径
在司法协助过程中，缔约双方的司法机关通过各自的司法部进行联系。
第五条 文字
除第八条第二款和第十九条第六项的规定外，司法协助的请求及其附件应用请求一方的文字写成，并附有被请求一方文字或英文的译文。
第二章 送达文书和调查取证
第六条 送达文书和调查取证的范围
就本章而言，送达文书是指送达司法文书和司法外文书；调查取证是指询问诉讼当事人、证人、鉴定人，进行鉴定和司法勘验以及完成其他与调查取证有关的司法行为。
第七条 送达文书和调查取证的请求书
一、请求书应包括以下内容：
（一）请求机关的名称；
（二）已知的被请求机关的名称；
（三）有关人员或其代理人的姓名、地址；如系法人，则该法人的名称和地址。
二、除前款所列各项外，调查取证的请求书还应包括以下内容：
（一）请求所涉及案件的情况说明；
（二）有关人员的国籍、职业、出生地和出生时间；
（三）请求的性质以及执行请求所需的其他说明。
第八条 送达文书
一、在实施送达请求过程中，被请求机关适用本国的法律。
二、如果所送达的文件未附被请求的缔约一方文字的准确译文，则被请求机关只有在受送达人自愿接受时方予送达。
三、被请求机关应根据其有关的法律规定证明文件的送达，证明中应注明送达的地点和时间。
四、如果不能按请求书所示地址找到受送达人，被请求机关应采取必要措施确定其地址。
五、如果被请求机关无法执行请求，则应通知请求机关并说明妨碍执行的原因。
六、缔约双方也可在受送达人自愿接受的情况下通过其外交或领事代表机关向在缔约另一方境内的本国国民送达文件。
第九条 调查取证请求的执行
一、在执行请求过程中，被请求机关适用其本国法律；应请求机关的要求也可采取请求书所指定的方式，但以不违反本国法律为限。
二、如果被请求机关不是执行请求的主管机关，应立即将请求送交主管机关并告知请求机关。
三、如果请求书提供的地址不准确，或者有关人员不在所提供的地址居住，被请求机关应努力确定其准确地址，必要时可要求请求机关提供补充说明。
四、被请求机关应将执行请求的结果通知请求机关，并随附所获得的证据。
五、如果请求无法执行，被请求机关应将文书退回请求机关并说明妨碍执行请求的原因。
第十条 通知调查取证的地点和时间
被请求机关应根据请求将调查取证的地点和时间及时通知请求机关，以便有关当事人或其代理人可依照被请求缔约一方的法律届时在场。
第十一条 证人和鉴定人的保护和豁免
一、经传唤在提出请求的缔约一方司法机关出庭的证人或鉴定人，不论其国籍如何，不得因其在离开被请求的缔约一方领土前的犯罪行为或被判定有罪而在提出请求的缔约一方境内对其起诉、拘留，或者采取其他限制人身自由的措施。对此种人员亦不得因其证词或鉴定而予以起诉、拘留或惩罚。
二、如经传唤机关告知已不再需要其出庭之日起连续三十日，证人或鉴定人有机会离开却仍在提出请求的缔约一方境内停留，或离开后又返回提出请求的缔约一方领土，前款规定的豁免则应予以终止。上述期间不应包括证人或鉴定人因其所不能控制的原因而未离开提出请求的缔约一方领土的时间。
第十二条 证人和鉴定人费用的补偿
一、请求机关向证人或鉴定人支付的生活费和偿还的旅费应自其离开居住地起算，并应按照至少等同于请求机关本国现行的标准和规则的规定进行计算。
二、请求机关应根据请求向证人或鉴定人预付全部或部分旅费和生活费。
第十三条 拒绝作证
在执行请求时，有关当事人可以拒绝出庭作证，如果：
（一）根据被请求的缔约一方的法律有拒绝作证的特权或义务；或者
（二）根据提出请求的缔约一方的法律有拒绝作证的特权或义务，并且此种特权或义务已在请求书中说明。
第十四条 送达文书和调查取证的拒绝
如果被请求的缔约一方认为送达文书和调查取证可能有损于本国的主权、安全或公共秩序，可予拒绝，但应将拒绝的理由通知提出请求的缔约一方。
第十五条 送达文书和调查取证的有关费用
缔约双方司法机关互相免费代为送达文书和调查取证，但被请求机关为执行请求而向鉴定人、译员支付的费用和按照本条约第九条第一款规定的特殊方式执行请求时所产生的费用除外。
第三章 裁决的承认与执行
第十六条 承认与执行裁决的范围
一、根据本条约规定的条件，缔约一方应承认与执行缔约另一方作出的下列裁决：
（一）法院对民事案件作出的裁决；
（二）法院就刑事案件中有关损害赔偿所作出的裁决。
二、本条所指“裁决”亦包括根据第二条规定被免除诉讼费用保证金或法院费用预付款的当事人应交纳诉讼费用的裁决，以及调解书。
三、符合本条约规定条件的“裁决”只有在本条约生效后才具有法律效力并可执行时，方可承认与执行。
第十七条 承认与执行的条件
本条约第十六条规定的裁决在下列条件下应予承认与执行：
（一）按照在其境内作出裁决的缔约一方的法律，该裁决是具有法律效力的和可执行的；
（二）按照被请求在其境内承认与执行裁决的缔约一方的法律，作出裁决的缔约一方的法院具有管辖权；
（三）按照在其境内作出裁决的缔约一方的法律，未出庭的败诉一方已经合法传唤，无诉讼行为能力的败诉一方已依法得到代理；
（四）被请求在其境内承认与执行裁决的缔约一方的法院事先未就相同当事人之间的同一案件作出具有法律效力的裁决，或当事人事先未就同一案件向上述缔约一方法院提出诉讼；
（五）裁决的承认与执行与被请求在其境内承认与执行裁决的缔约一方法律的基本原则不相抵触。
第十八条 请求的提出
关于承认与执行裁决的请求，可由双方当事人直接向承认与执行裁决的主管法院提出，也可由缔约一方法院按本条约第四条规定的途径向缔约另一方承认与执行裁决的主管法院提出。
第十九条 请求的附件
承认与执行裁决的申请应附以下文件：
（一）裁决的完整和准确的副本；
（二）向败诉一方送达裁决的证明，或其他任何替代送达证明的真实文件；
（三）裁决具有法律效力的证明，如果裁决本身不能表明它是最终的话；
（四）对于缺席裁决，证明缺席裁决的被告已经合法传唤的文件，除非裁决本身已对此予以说明；
（五）证明无行为能力的当事人已得到适当代理的文件，除非裁决本身已对此予以说明；
（六）上述裁决和文件的被请求的缔约一方文字的准确译文。
第二十条 承认与执行裁决的方式
一、缔约双方的法院根据本国的法律承认与执行裁决。
二、缔约双方的法院应仅限于审查裁决是否符合本条约规定的条件，不应对裁决作实质性审查。
第四章 其他规定
第二十一条 交换情报
一、缔约双方相互提供本国现行的法律及其司法实践的情报。
二、提供情报的请求应注明请求机关的名称及请求提供情报所涉及的案情。
第二十二条 认证的免除
在适用本条约时，缔约一方司法机关或其他主管机关在其权限范围内制作或证明的文件及其译文，如经签署并加盖公章，则在缔约另一方司法机关和其他主管机关使用时无需认证。
第二十三条 争议的解决
缔约双方因解释或实施本条约所产生的任何争议应通过外交途径解决。
第五章 最后条款
第二十四条 批准和生效
本条约须经批准，批准书在布达佩斯互换。本条约自互换批准书之日起第三十日开始生效。
第二十五条 终止
本条约自缔约任何一方通过外交途径书面提出终止通知之日起六个月后失效，否则，本条约无限期有效。
本条约于一九九五年十月九日在北京签订，一式两份，用中文和匈牙利文写成，两种文本同等作准。
缔约双方全权代表在本条约上签字，以昭信守。
中华人民共和国代表 匈牙利共和国代表
肖 扬 沃什道格·帕尔
（签字） （签字）
